This paper examines dollar interventions by the G3 governments since 1989, and the reasons that trader reactions to these interventions might differ over time and across central banks. Market microstructure theory provides a framework for understanding the process by which sterilized central bank interventions are observed and interpreted by traders, and how this process, in turn, might influence exchange rates. Using intra-daily and daily exchange rate and intervention data, the paper analyzes the influence of interventions on exchange rate volatility, finding evidence of both within day and daily impact effects, but little evidence that interventions increase longer-term volatility.
I. Introduction
On May 31, 1995 the U.S. government purchased a total of $500 million against marks and $500 million against yen on three occasions between the hours of 1:45pm and 2:26pm (Eastern Standard Time), resulting in a 2% increase in the value of the dollar against both the mark and yen over the course of the day.
1 On other occasions when the U.S. government intervened in the dollar exchange rate market, however, the dollar either moved in the opposite direction to that expected, or did not move at all. This paper examines dollar interventions by the G3 governments since 1989, and the reasons that market reactions to these interve ntions might differ over time and across central banks.
Standard models of exchange rate determination identify at least two channels through which interventions might be expected to influence exchange rates: the portfolio balance channel and the signaling channel. However, neither of these channels is easily reconciled with the empirical evidence, which suggests that sometimes intervention works and sometimes it does not. Of course, standard exchange rate determination models have a difficult time expla ining (often the lack of) exchange rate reactions to all kinds of purportedly fundamental information, suggesting that it may be worth reexamining standard models before drawing conclusions regarding the efficacy of intervention.
One approach to exchange rate modeling that has gone some distance toward reconciling observed short-term currency movements and economic theory is the market microstructure approach. In the context of intervention, market microstructure provides a 1 During New York trading hours on May 31, 1995 the dem-usd rate opened at 1.385 and closed at 1.4135 and the yen-usd rate opened at 82.70 and closed at 84.40. The Bundesbank and the BOJ coordinated their interventions with the Fed on this day. Reuters reports indicate that the Bundesbank purchased $395.6 million against the mark on two occasions (starting just before the Fed was in the market), and the BOJ purchased $767.4 million against yen on one occasion (just before the last Fed operation).
framework for understanding the process by which central bank interventions are observed and interpreted by traders, and how this process, in turn, might result in exchange rate changes. Even if interventions are informative, for example if they reveal information that is considered pric e relevant, exchange rates might not react immediately if traders learn about interventions at different times. Likewise, if interventions are largely non-informative (and are simply a central bank's attempt to target exchange rates away from fundamentals), interventions might still impact prices and volatility in the very short-run if traders misinterpret the (lack of) information content of the interventions.
Recent advances in market microstructure theory, new sources of data on exchange rates and central bank interventions, and in particular, the availability of high frequency data, offer new tools with which to shed light on the old question of when central bank interventions are likely to influence exchange rates.
2 Section II offers a simple version of a market microstructure model and introduces a role for intervention.
Section III describes the G3 intervention and exchange rate data. Section IV provides an empirical examination of the intra-day and daily dynamics of interventions and exchange rate volatility. Section 5 is the conclusion.
II. Market Microstructure and Intervention
The exchange rate microstructure model developed by Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2003) provides a way to think about why trader heterogeneity (based on differences in information or the interpretation of information) might lead to short-run price and volatility effects in reaction to information revelation. 3 Interventions can easily be included in the model with the potential to provide price-relevant information. In this model, both information-based trades and non-informative trades can move exchange rates in the short run depending on aggregate market ability to differentiate noise from fundamentals. The model assumes that longer-term exchange rate behavior is well expla ined by fundamentals.
Consider a standard asset pricing model of exchange rates in which the current exchange rate, e t , is the discounted present value of expected macro fundamental differentials, M t+k , and a risk premium, rp t+k , associated with non-fundamentals trade.
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Assume traders have higher order expectations, k t E (such that the exchange rate at time t depends on the fundamental at time t, and the average expectation of the fundamental in all future periods, as a consequence of which the expectation of other investors' expectations matters). Exchange rates may then be expressed as:
where β can be interpreted as the interest semi-elasticity of money demand. If market participants receive information (or signals) at time t about future fundamentals, M t+k , but this information is not common knowledge (either because people receive difference bits of information or because they interpret the information differently), then there is a common average signal among traders (assuming there are large numbers of market 3 See Lyons (2001) for a thorough discussion of market microstructure in foreign exchange markets as well as Evans and Lyons (2002ab) . For a more general treatment of market microstructure see O'Hara (1995) . 4 In Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2003) the risk premium arises because some proportion of investors have a noisy expected excess return on foreign bonds and the net supply of foreign bonds resulting from the expectational error is non-observable (so that the irrational agents do not know their expectational error). participants) but heterogeneity across individuals (and traders will expect their own expectation next period to differ from that of others). Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2003) show that this sort of information heterogeneity leads both to magnification and to endoge nous persistence of the impact of non-fundamentals trade on the exchange rate.
Government exchange market interventions in this kind of setting may provide information to market participants that allows them to distinguish more accurately between fundamental and non-fundamental information. Define an intervention operation known to individual i at time t, interventions will increase short-term non-fundamentals induced exchange rate movements. Over time interventions should become common knowledge and the market will learn the value of ρ . Therefore, only those interventions that are informative should be expected to have long-term effects on exchange rates. This suggests that the very short-run influence of interventions may differ from its longer run effects.
Previous empirical tests of how microstructure issues might influence the relationship between intervention and exchange rates include Beattie and Fillion (1999) , Cai, Cheung, Lee and Melvin (2001) , Chang and Taylo r (1998) , Dominguez (2003a) , Evans and Lyons (2001) , Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) , Goodhart and Hesse (1993) , Neely (2002) , Pasquariello (2001 Pasquariello ( , 2002 , Payne and Vitale (forthcoming) and Peiers (1997) . Each of these studies focuses on the effects of different central banks over different sample periods, often using different data sets, making cross study comparisons difficult. As a general matter, and in contrast to papers that study the longer-term effects of sterilized central bank interventions, studies examining intra-daily effect of intervention find strong evidence of impact effects.
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LeBaron's (1999) finding that intervention days are the source of unusual profits for traders using technical analysis is noteworthy in this context. He finds that simple moving average trading rule profits are significant in daily forex data if intervention days are included in the sample --when interventions are excluded, profits go to zero. Using more finely timed data, Neely (2002) however, finds that interventions are unlikely to have "caused" the increase in trading rule profits, but instead that interventions tend to arise 5 For example, Peiers (1997) examines how interactions between informed (defined to be indications provided by Deutsche Bank (DB)) and uninformed foreign exchange traders (indications given by all other banks) give rise to short-term price leadership during periods of central bank intervention. She finds that, during the period October 1992 to September 1993, volatility increases five minutes prior to Bundesbank interventions, and that there is evidence of DB price leadership from 60 to 25 minutes prior to Reuters reports.
during periods when exchange rates are trending in a manner that would likely lead to technical trading rule profits.
III. G3 Intervention and Excha nge Rate Data
The intra-daily exchange rate data used in this paper are the Reuter's FXFX series tick-by-tick indicative quotes on Fed intervention days as well as a control sample of 25 days with no interventions. 6 A limitation of the FXFX data is that because they are quotes and not transactions they do not provide volume information, so it is not possible to examine the joint dynamics of volume (or order flow) and price. 7 Another disadvantage of the data set is that, because it includes only intervent ion days, it is not possible to measure persistent effects of interventions.
The FXFX data used in the paper cover 69 days over the period August 1989 to August 1995 when the Fed intervened in the dem-usd market, and 66 days when the Fed intervened in the yen-usd market. 8 The propensity to intervene on a given day varied across the sample period. The U.S, Japanese and German governments all intervened actively in the early part of the sample, while only the Bank of Japan (BOJ) continued to actively interve ne after 1992. Figures 1 and 2 show daily U.S. dollar intervention 6 The data are collected by Olsen and Associates (Research Institute for Applied Economics, Zurich Switzerland) using O&A proprietary real-time data collection software and are filtered as recommended by Dacorogna et al. (1993) . The control dates were selected to provide a representative sample of nonintervention days over the period when the intervention operations take place. These data are used to create the volatility seasonal used in the empirical tests to follow. 7 Goodhart et al. (1996) and Danielsson and Payne (2002) find that the basic characteristics of 5-minute FXFX returns closely match those calculated for transactions prices but find that quote frequency and bidask spreads in the FXFX data are not good proxies to transaction volume or spreads. operations in the mark and yen markets along with the corresponding bilateral exchange rates over the sample period.
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The G3 central banks release historical daily intervention data. Unfortunately, they do not provide the exact timing of interventions, nor do they disclose how many operations occurred over the course of the day. 10 The only available source of timing information for G3 interventions comes from Reuters reports of intervent ions (which is also the most likely source of information for those traders in the market that are not directly involved in the intervention transaction).
The Reuters news reports used in this study are from the Reuters AAMM Page News (Money Market Headline News). Along with reports of central bank intervention, the Reuters data include announcements of various macroeconomic statistics, statements by central bank and government officials and reports of major economic events. In order to control for the impact of other news on exchange rates, these Reuters news reports are also included in the empirical work. In particular, dummy variables indicate the timing of all major macroeconomic announcements and statements regarding exchange rate policy by officia ls of the G-3 central banks on the intervention sample days. Table 1 lists each of the dummy variables created from the Reuters reports and the day-of-week and average time (GMT) when the announcements are made. 9 In the United States the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve have independent legal authority to intervene in foreign exchange markets. In practice, the U.S. Treasury and the Fed typically act jointly and split the costs of intervention equally against their separate accounts. The New York Fed implements intervention policy for the United States and for this reason I follow the convention of associating U.S. intervention operations with the Fed in the paper. Similarly, in Japan intervention decisions are made by the Ministry of Finance and implemented by the Bank of Japan (BOJ). The Bundesbank had sole jurisdiction over German intervention decisions and implemented intervention operations prior to 1999. 10 The Swiss National Bank is an exception. The SNB provides exact timing and transaction prices for interventions (see Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) , Payne and Vitale (forthcoming) and Pasquarliello (2001) for studies using these data).
The Reuters reports indicate that central banks typically intervene during business hours in their respective markets. 11 Frequency distributions of the times of G3 intervention suggest that the BOJ is most likely to intervene at 3:56:36 GMT (or around 1pm in Tokyo). The Bundesbank is most likely to intervene at 11:31:16 GMT (or at 12:30pm in Frankfurt). And, the Fed is most likely to intervene at 14:57:10 GMT (or 10am EST). Table 2 shows the relative timing of the Tokyo, Frankfurt and New York markets using the GMT scale and indicates the times when Reuters reports that each central bank is most likely to be in the market. It is worth noting that Tokyo business hours end just as the Frankfurt market opens and the New York market overlaps the Frankfurt market for two hours. The New York market closes two hours before the Tokyo financial market opens.
Getting the timing of interventions right is critical to measuring the short-term influence of interventions on foreign exchange markets. Evidence in Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003) and Almeida, Goodhart and Payne (1998) suggests that conditional mean adjustments of exchange rates to macro news occur quickly (though they also find that conditional variance adjustments are more gradual). Tables 3   and 4 
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Before formally testing for a relationship between exchange rates, intervention and macro announcements, it is interesting to examine the 25 largest returns over the sample period together with the Reuters time-stamped events that surround these unusually large returns. Tables 4 and 5 
IV. Measuring the Intra-daily influences of central bank interventions
A fundamental property of high frequency data is that observations can occur at varying time intervals resulting in irregular spacing of quotes. Standard econometric techniques require regularly spaced data. The approach to irregularly spaced data used in this paper is to create from these data a regularly spaced time series over a discrete time interval. Defining the tick-by-tick price (P) as the average of the bid and ask:
( where t,n is the sequence of the regular-spaced in time data and n is the time interval. 13 Equivalently, the nth return (R) on day t is defined as:
( 1.5) ,,,1 tntntn
and volatility, V t,n , is measured as the absolute value of the 5-minute returns.
A number of previous studies have documented a strong seasonal pattern in the average 5-minute exchange rate volatility (see, for example, Bollerslev and Domowitz (1993) , Dacorogna et al. (1993) and Guillaume et al. (1997) ). This seasonality is also readily apparent in both the sample of Fed intervention days and the control sample days.
Failure to take account of these intra-daily seasonals is likely to result in misleading statistical analyses. In this paper de-seasonalization of the volatility series is achieved using the Anderson and Bollerslev (1997ab, 1998 version of Gallant's (1981) flexible fourier form regression method.
Figures 3 and 4 shows average absolute dem-usd and yen-usd returns, respectively, for each 5-minute interval across both the control sample days and the Fed intervention days, along with estimated intra-day seasonal. The seasonal is calculated using the Andersen and Bollerslev (1997a) flexible fourier form framework, which decomposes the demeaned 5-minute returns into a daily volatility factor, σ t , a periodic component for the nth intraday interval, s t,n and an i.i.d. mean zero unit variance innovation term, Z t,n .
( 1.6) ,, ,, where N 1 =(N+1)/2 and N 2 =(N+1)(N+2)/6 are normalized constants, N refers to the number of return intervals per day (N=288), the tuning parameter P (P=8) determines the order of the expansion 14 , the J flexible fourier forms are parameterized by quadratic components 14 Bollerslev (1997a, 1998) and Cai, Cheung, Lee and Melvin (2001) find that P=6 fits the dem-usd FXFX data over the sample 92-93 and the yen-usd FXFX data in 1998. Experimentation with (terms with µ-coefficients), a number of sinusoids (the γ and δ coefficients) and timespecific dummies (the λ coefficients). In practice estimation involved a two-step procedure where $ , tn x was replaced by the sample mean of the 5-minute returns and treated as the dependent variable in the regression defined by equations (1.6) and (1.7). Defining µ , tn f as the resulting estimate for the right hand side of equation (1.7) P=4,6 and 8 using both the control sample and Fed intervention day samples (over the years [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] , indicate that P=8 offers the best fit with these data. 15 See Dominguez (2003a) for a similar "event study" approach using returns rather than volatility. 16 Estimates of the intra -daily seasonal using the Fed intervention days produced very similar results. Control sample days were used under the assumption that volatility on intervention days may differ from non-intervention days (indeed figures 3 and 4 suggest that especially for the yen-usd market Fed intervention days are more volatile than the control sample days), and while it is necessary to control for intra-day cycles, it is also important not to inadvertently explain away what is unusual about intervention days by only using intervention days to calculate the seasonal. I am grateful to Michael Melvin for suggesting I use the control sample days for this purpose.
Interventions in the event study by all three central banks take the value 1 if they involve a purchase or sale of dollars and 0 otherwise. Interventions are included as (1,0) dummy variables both because the dollar magnitudes are generally only available at a daily (not intra-daily) frequency, and because there is some evidence that the sizes of interventions depend on market reactions to initial trades suggesting that including magnitudes might engender simultaneity bias. German macro announcements are also found to be significant, with the significant lags varying from impact to fifteen minutes after the Reuters time-stamp. The announcement with the largest average influence on dem-usd variability is U.S. GNP. The intra-day seasonal is highly significant in the regression. The interventions, announcements, macro controls and seasonal together explain just under 25% of intra-day dem-usd volatility.
17 Various regression specifications were attempted, including imposing a polynomial distributed lag (pdl) structure on the leads and lags of the intervention variables. Tests of the pdl restrictions suggested that the data do not conform to this specification. Experimentation with various lead and lag combinations indicated that a [-1hr,+2hr ] window for the intervention variables and a [0,1hr] window for the macroeconomic announcements was appropriate.
The results of the yen-usd volatility event-study regression are presented in Table 8 .
In The second alternative specification serves as a test of whether interventions that are timed close to a (scheduled) macro announcement have different effects than those that are not. The dummy variable distinguishing those interventions that occurred within a twohour window of a macro announcement are significant in both the dem-usd and yen-usd volatility regressions. The relative size of the coefficients on the interactive dummy suggests that these interventions have larger effects on volatility than interventions that are not timed close to other announcements (although these continue to be significant in the regressions). One possible explanation for this result is that traders are more sensitive to news (including intervention news) at times when other major announcements are released.
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The final set of alternative specifications examines the extent to which coordination matters. Interventions are defined as being "coordinated" if at least one other of the G3 central banks intervened within a two hour window (and in the same direction). In the case of the dem-usd market, 31% of all Fed interventions over this period were coordinated with the Bundesbank. The results suggest that those interventions that were coordinated have a slightly larger influence on volatility than unilateral interventions. Interestingly, the lag effects for coordinated interventions last a good hour beyond those for unilateral interventions. In the yen-usd market, 54% of all Fed interventions over this period were coordinated with the BOJ. Results again suggest that both coordinated and unilateral Fed interventions influence volatility, though the size of the effect is actually larger for unilateral interventions. As in the dem-usd market, coordinated interventions had significant lag effects on yen-usd volatility for an hour and a half after the Reuters report, while the influence of unilateral interventions lasted for about forty-five minutes.
The event study results indicate that G3 interventions systematically influenced intra-day exchange rate volatility over the sample period examined, August 1989 through August 1995. The coefficient estimates indicate that Reuters reports generally lag interventions by one hour, and intervention continues to influence volatility up to one and a half hours after the Reuters report release, suggesting that intervention is neither common knowledge, nor perfectly informative. It is also worth noting that all the coefficients on intervention in tables 7 and 8 are positive, indicating that in the very short run interventions are always associated with increases in volatility.
The next set of tests, reported in Tables 9, 10 and 11, examine the influence of G3 interventions on daily volatility
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. Recall from the model in section II that trader heterogeneity can make even informative intervention increase very short run exchange rate volatility, though over time interventions should become common knowledge, and traders should sort out any misinterpretation of intervention's information content. Daily realized dem-usd and yen-usd volatility is measured using the intra-daily returns data.
Following Anderson and Bollerslev (1998) we sum the squared 5-minute FXFX indicative quote returns over each day (through GMT22)
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, such that:
19 A number of papers have examined the influence of intervention on daily exchange rate volatility. See, for example, Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1996) , Dominguez (1998) , Chaboud and LeBaron (2001) , Galati, Melick and Micu (2002) , Frenkel, Pierdzioch, and Stadtmann (2003) and Beine (2003) . 20 The daily integrated volatilities were created by Steve Weinberg. The daily cutoff is GMT22 when volatility is generally very low. Weekends are excluded and the volatilities are expressed as annualized standard deviations.
to create a daily integrated volatility series. This measure better captures current volatility relative to standard models such as GARCH because it is able to exploit contemporaneous intraday information. As Anderson, Bollerslev, Diebold and Labys (2003) explain, "Suppose, for example, that the true volatility has been low for many days, t=1,...T-1, so that both realized and GARCH volatilities are presently low as well. Now suppose that the true volatility increases sharply on day T and that the effect is highly persistent as is typical. Realized volatility for day, T, which makes effective use of the day-T information, will increase sharply as well, as is appropriate. GARCH or RiskMetrics volatility, in contrast, will not change at all on day T, as they depend only on squared returns from days T-1, T-2,..., and they will increase only gradually on subsequent days, as they approximate volatility via a long and slowly decaying exponentially weighted moving average."
In the context of measuring the impact of interventions on volatility -it is particularly important that our measure of volatility reflect current (and not necessarily past) market conditions. Figures 5 and 6 show the integrated volatility series as well as a MA(1)-GARCH(1,1) volatility measure for the dem-usd and yen-usd, respectively. Unsurprisingly the GARCH series are much smoother than the integrated volatility series, though both sets of volatilities tend to move together. Table 9 presents statistics on the distribution of the logarithm of realized volatility for dem-usd and yen-usd, over the full sample period as well as on intervention days. For the full sample (and non-intervention days sample) the measures of skewness and kurtosis suggest the series are approximately Gaussian and the Ljung-Box statistics indicate strong serial correlation.
21 Further, the estimates of the degree of fractional 21 Five observations in the dem-usd realized volatility series were significant outliers and are excluded from the sample. Realized volatility on September 14, 1992 is two times higher than the second highest day and realized volatilities on Septemb er 3-4, 1991and May 12-13, 1994 are three times smaller than the next lowest day. We replaced these outliers with values from the next highest (or lowest) realized volatilities in the sample distribution. Replacing these outliers does not significantly change the regression results in Table 10 , but does influence the skewness and kurtosis statistics for the full and non-intervention integration, d, are significantly greater than zero and less than .5, which indicates evidence of long-run dependence in the logarithmic volatilities. It is interesting to note that on "all" interventions days, and particularly on coordinated intervention days, the mean realized volatility is significantly larger than on non-intervention days. Realized volatility on the day after an intervention remains higher for the dem-usd but not for yenusd, and volatility on the day before an intervention is no higher, on average, than on other non-intervention days.
The statistics in table 9 suggest that the long-memory dynamics of the realized logarithmic volatilities are best modeled using a fractional integration or ARFIMA where d is the fractional parameter, L denotes the lag operator, φ denotes the AR parameter (set to 0 in the case of yen-usd), v t denotes the log of the integrated volatility samples in Table 9 . There were no apparent outliers in the yen-usd realized volatility series. 
V. Conclusions
This paper identifies circumstances in which central bank interventions influence exchange rates. Microstructure theory suggests that trader heterogeneity can cause exchange rates to move away from fundamentals in the short-run. Introducing intervention operations into an already confused market, in turn, can increase the influence of nonfundamentals trading on exchange rate movements. Over time, however, interventions are common knowledge and traders should be able to distinguish informative from non-informative interventions. This suggests that the influence of interventions on exchange rates may well differ over the very short and longer runs.
The empirical tests in this paper examine the influence of G3 interventions on demusd and yen-usd intra-daily (5-minute) indicative quote volatility as well as a measure of realized daily volatility. Results suggest that intervention operations, especially those that were coordinated, were consistently associated with increases in intra-day and daily volatility, while there is little evidence that interventions influenced longer-term volatility.
The fact that interventions did not lead to longer-term increases in volatility may help explain why governments, who presumably prefer not to increase market volatility, continue to rely on interventions to influence currency values. where V is 5-min dem-usd volatility (measured as the absolute value of the 5-min returns); the D k s include intervention, official central bank announcements and macro announcements; i=-1 to +2hrs for the G-3 intervention variables and official announcements and i=0 to +1hr for the macro announcements; t,n is the sequence of the regular-spaced (every 5 minutes) intra-daily data for all the days on which the Fed interve ned against the mark from 1989 to 1995 (69 days and a total of 151 reports of Fed operations). The reported coefficients are multiplied by 100. 2 Interventions that occur within 2 hours of a macro news announcement are defined as "close".
3 Coordinated interventions are defined as Fed interventions that occur on the same day as at least one other of the G-3 central banks. 4 The coefficient is the sum of the 36 lead and lag coefficients on each of the intervention variables. **, * denote statistical significance (of the 36 leads and lags) at the 1%, and 5% levels, respectively, using robust standard errors. where V is 5-min yen-usd volatility; D k s include intervention, official central bank announcements and macro announcements; i=-1 to +2hrs for the G-3 intervention variables and official announcements and i=0 to +1hr for the macro announcements; t,n is the sequence of the regular-spaced (every 5 minutes) intra-daily data for all the days on which the Fed intervened against the yen from 1989 to 1995 (66 days and a total of 192 reports of Fed operations). The reported coefficients are multiplied by 100. 2 Interventions that occur within 2 hours of a macro news announcement are defined as "close".
3 Coordinated interventions are defined as Fed interventions that occur on the same day as at least one other of the G-3 central banks. 4 The coefficient is the sum of the 36 lead and lag coefficients on each of the intervention variables. **, and * denote statistical significance (of the 36 leads and lags) at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively, using robust standard errors. Note: An ARFIMA(1,d,0) was used to model dem-usd integrated volatility and an ARFIMA(0,d,0) was used to model yen-usd integrated volatility. Results for the variables of interest (the D k s) were robust to alternative ARFIMA specifications. **, * and † denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, using robust standard errors. Note: ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively, using robust standard errors. The likelihood ratio statistics suggest that we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
